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Abstract: We analyze the economic effects of a developer’s connectedness in the electronic game 
industry. Knowledge spillovers between developers should be of special relevance in this knowledge-
based industry. We calculate measures for a developer’s connectedness to other developers at 
multiple points in time. In a regression with developer, developing firm, publishing firm, and time 
fixed effects, we find that the number of a developer’s direct ties, i.e., common past experience, has 
a strong effect on both a game’s revenues and critics’ scores. The intensity of indirect ties makes no 
additional contribution to the game’s success. 
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1. Introduction 
In his seminal work, Granovetter (1973, 1983) distinguishes between strong and weak ties when 
describing an actor’s social interactions. In a close network in which actors are directly connected by 
strong ties, everyone knows everyone else and information is quickly shared. However, such a close 
network might not work so well in terms of gaining new information. By contrast, a wide network 
that indirectly but weakly links actors from the close network to outside actors offers new sources of 
information and “whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse 
greater social distance” (Granovetter 1983, p. 1366). 
Using measures from social network analysis, we study the economic effects of a developer’s 
connectedness in the fast-growing electronic game industry.1 The game industry is an intensely 
knowledge-based industry in which knowledge spillovers via the social networks among developers 
are probably very relevant. We use the ‘degree centrality’ measure to count a developer’s direct 
connections to other developers. A direct connection is defined as forming when two or more 
parties jointly worked on a project, thus having common experience. Degree centrality thus 
measures how many strong ties a developer has. The ‘closeness’ measure is the mean geodesic 
distance from one developer to any other developer and thus measures the average intensity of a 
developer’s ties. 
To test the theory we compiled a unique dataset derived from two sources. We use MobyGames, a 
comprehensive electronic game documentation project, as a source of information about the 
members of game development teams.2 These data allow us to calculate the (cumulative) degree 
centrality measure and the (cumulative) closeness measure for a developer at any point in time at 
which he or she was involved in a project since the early days of the game industry in 1972. We link 
these social network measures with revenue information from the NPD database, which includes 
information for every electronic game commercially released in the United States between 1995 and 
2007. Along with revenue, we also use critics’ scores from MobyGames as an alternative indicator of 
a game’s success. 
Given the special features of our data, we can include in our analysis a whole set of fixed effects at 
different levels of aggregation, including developer, developing firm, and publishing firm fixed 
effects. These fixed effects help us isolate the effect of social interaction on a certain outcome from 
other confounding influences (Manski 1993) of unobserved time-persistent developer, developing 
firm, or publishing firm factors. One problem not addressed by the fixed effects framework is the 
                                                          
1 In 2007, the electronic game industry grew 43%, reaching total sales of U.S.$ 18 billion. 
2 Developer networks are also analyzed by Fershtman and Gandal (2009) for the case of open source software. 
The analysis of co-authorships (Goyal et al. 2006) is also similar to our work. 
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reciprocal nature of social interaction that likely introduces simultaneity problems when using 
contemporaneous social network measures. We solve this problem by lagging our social network 
measures. However, this approach ignores the additional value of the developer’s contemporaneous 
connectedness, which may result in an underestimate of social interaction (Hanushek et al. 2003).  
Based on more than 150,000 observations, we find in our fixed effects specification a significantly 
positive effect of a developer’s (lagged) degree centrality measure on a game’s success. The result is 
robust to the inclusion of several control variables, including a time trend, team size, tenure of the 
developer, and co-developers’ social network measures. We also find evidence of heterogeneity of 
this effect between lead and non-lead developers. By contrast, the developer’s closeness measure 
contributes no additional explanatory power. These results suggest that direct ties foster local 
sharing of knowledge and thus strongly contribute to the success of a game, whereas the intensity of 
indirect, weak ties has no significant influence on the game’s success. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes central features of the 
electronic game industry. In Section 3, we set out our estimation strategy, introduce our data, and 
report the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The Electronic Game Industry 
2.1. Industry Background 
The electronic game industry encompasses both video and computer games. Video games are 
developed for game or handheld consoles; computer games are developed for personal computers. 
There are two main ‘players’ when it comes to the software side of the electronic game industry: the 
developing firm designs, creates, and codes the game; the publishing firm provides financing, 
packaging, marketing, and manages relationships with retailers and console providers. Even though 
the first electronic game was created in 1952 at the University of Cambridge, the electronic game 
industry did not really start gathering steam until the launch of the first video game console, the 
Magnavox Odyssey, in 1972, and only began to flourish with the introduction of personal computers 
in 1976 (Kent 2001). 
The video game industry has evolved over what can be thought of as seven generations, each 
encompassing two to five different game consoles having similar, but steadily increasing, 
computational power. First-generation games cost anywhere from U.S.$ 1,000–10,000 to develop; 
currently, this cost ranges between U.S.$ 5–30 million (Hight and Novak 2008). The increase in 
development costs is driven by technological progress in gaming devices, leading to bigger 
development teams. In the early years of the industry, a game development team usually consisted 
of two people: a designer and a programmer. As graphics were poor, art-related work was mostly 
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done by the designer. However, with the introduction of compact discs as a storage medium and the 
development in 1995 of 3D graphics by Sony, artists became increasingly important to the process. 
To make the game look realistic, it became necessary to use the talents of various specialists, such as 
object or environment modelers, and team sizes increased correspondingly, now ranging, on 
average, 30 to 80 members (Hight and Novak 2008). The latest development in the electronic game 
industry occurred in 2005 with the introduction of the seventh generation of consoles. As these 
consoles include Internet connectivity, the computer and video game segments converged, resulting 
in a new type of electronic games, the so-called Massively Multiplayer Online Games that can 
accommodate hundreds of thousands of individuals playing simultaneously in a virtual world. 
2.2. Composition of Game Developer Teams 
The composition and size of game development teams evolved in step with technological change 
and the consequent increase in game complexity. At the same time, increased team sizes resulted in 
the hierarchical separation of the team into lead and non-lead members, with lead members 
fulfilling mostly supervisory and managerial functions, and non-lead members mostly being involved 
in implementation. The hierarchical structure of the team depends on the complexity of the game 
and the overall structure of the developing firm. For a simple game or a small developing firm, the 
same team member can perform multiple tasks, whereas in the case of a complex game or a larger 
developing firm, each team member is responsible for a single, clearly defined task. 
Typically, a development team is comprised of four main occupations: producer, game designer, 
artist, and programmer (Chandler 2009). Producers manage and track the game development 
process and ensure that the game is released on time and within budget. Game designers develop 
the main story, characters, and levels, and set the rules of the game (Novak 2008). Artists create the 
concept art and graphics for the game, e.g., characters, vehicles, and buildings. Their tasks include 
drawing, modeling, texturing, and animation (Chandler 2009). Programmers create the game code 
and develop the tools that the designers and artists need for their work (Novak 2008). Other parts of 
the game development process include audio design, game testing, and quality assurance, but these 
tasks are typically outsourced (Novak 2008). We focus on producers, game designers, artists, and 
programmers when building our social network measures as these positions interact a great deal 
during the creation of a game. 
2.3. Developers’ Networks in the Game Industry 
The organizational structure of most firms in the electronic game industry can best be described as 
decentralized and project based with a high level of autonomy. The producer puts together a team 
that will temporarily work together to create a single game, after which the team members are 
usually individually assigned to other projects. That is the team does not stay together for more than 
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one project, although, depending on the size of the firm, there is often some overlap. Although large 
developing firms try to retain talented people with attractive HRM practices, employee turnover is 
still very high in the gaming sector (Cadin et al. 2006). The project-based structure of the firms, the 
highly interdependent development process, and the high employee turnover rate lead to a lot of 
exchange between game developers, making this industry a suitable and interesting environment in 
which to study knowledge spillovers. 
3. The Connectedness of a Developer and Success of a Game 
3.1. Identification of Social Network Effects 
History matters when identifying social network effects because members of a network have 
common past experience and thus are also most likely to share many omitted historical factors that 
might bias the effect of social network effects on an outcome. Furthermore, when we measure the 
impact of social network effects on current outcomes — in our case, the impact of a developer’s 
connectedness on a game’s success — there are also many omitted current factors that influence 
both the success of a game and the size and quality of a developer’s current social network. One 
very relevant example of an omitted or not fully observable factor is the resources spent by the 
publishing firm for the game’s development. These resources could have a direct impact on the 
success of a game, and will also be somewhat determinative of the size and composition of the 
project team, and, eventually, the connectedness of a developer. This might result in an important 
upward bias of the impact of social network effects on the success of a game. 
To circumvent the problem of not fully knowing the amount of resources dedicated to a game’s 
development, one could simply use lagged social network measures of the developer. However, if 
social networks are persistent over time, this strategy will not solve the problem because even 
lagged social network measures will be correlated with the current error term. Thus, one has to 
additionally consider fixed effects on different levels, i.e., the developer, the developing firm, or the 
publishing firm, in order to extract fixed components that do not vary over time. However, this 
approach ignores the additional value of the developer’s contemporaneous connectedness, which 
may lead to an underestimation of social network effects. 
Against this background, our estimation equation is: 
                                                         (1) 
S is a measure of success for game g of developing firm d and publishing firm p. Our network 
measures are on the level of the individual developer i. Thus, the outcome variable is the same for 
all developers in a game project. We consider this nested structure of our data by clustering the 
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error term        on the game level.    are developer fixed effects. Thus, we can consider only those 
developers that were engaged in at least two game projects over time t.    are fixed effects for the 
developing firm that usually decides on hiring the team.    are publishing firm fixed effects. The 
publishing firm decides on the resources to be spent for development and marketing of a game.    is 
a full set of dummies for the year a game was launched. These time dummies control for 
macroeconomic influences or changes in preferences toward electronic games in general. The time 
dummies also account for the increasing size of development teams and technological progress in 
gaming devices. Further control variables are included in the matrix        , including, among 
others, tenure of the developer and size of the project team, as well as dummies for licensed titles, 
genre, release month, and platform. 
To measure the connectedness of the individual developer, we use two lagged network measures: 
the degree centrality measure D and the closeness measure C, both of which are well established in 
social network analysis (for a review, see Freeman 2006). Degree centrality is a measure for the 
number of direct connections a developer has. A direct connection is defined as forming when two 
(or more) developers jointly work on a game project. It is thus a proxy for a developer’s strong ties. 
We calculate degree centrality relative to the size of the network: 
       
                                          
                          
      (2) 
The closeness measure is the inverse of the average length of paths from one developer to all other 
developers in the game industry, whereby the developers are again connected by having worked on 
joint game projects. Closeness is thus a measure of the intensity of the ties, i.e., weak or strong ties: 
        
                                      
                          
 
  
      (3) 
The shorter the average path length from the focal developer to all developers, the higher the value 
of the measure. Conditional on the degree centrality measure,    gives us the additional impact of 
the intensity of weak ties on a game’s success. Calculation of the network measures is explained in 
greater detail in the data section of the paper. 
3.2. Data from the Electronic Game Industry 
Our data are derived from two sources: MobyGames and the NPD database. MobyGames is the 
largest and most detailed video game documentation project in the world, containing 
comprehensive information on more than 16,000 games published between 1972 and 2009.3 All 
information is provided by users of the site on a voluntary basis. To ensure accuracy, MobyGames 
                                                          
3
 For more details, see http://mobygames.com. 
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has a strict set of coding instructions and requires all entries to be peer reviewed before they are 
published. For most games featured in MobyGames, we have information on the platform, release 
date, and the individuals and firms that developed and published the game (credits). We use the 
dataset from the beginning of the industry in 1972 up to 2007 to calculate our social network 
measures. 
We use the data from MobyGames to calculate our two social network measures, i.e., degree 
centrality and closeness. The MobyGames data include information on all developers who 
participated in the development of a game. Based on these data, we create one-mode networks in 
which two developers are directly connected if they have worked together on a project.4 We 
construct one-mode networks for every year from 1995 to 2007, with the networks becoming larger 
over time. That is, the 1995 network contains all developers and their connections in 1972 as well as 
all connections formed from games released in 1995, as well as every year in between. The 1996 
network includes all connections initiated up till 1996 and so on. We thus calculate cumulative 
network measures.5 
The MobyGames data are then matched with revenue data collected by NPD, a market research 
firm. The NPD dataset covers the electronic game industry since 1995.6 NPD’s retail tracking service 
monitors retail sales of electronic games and consoles in the United States, covering all distribution 
channels, including online sales.7 From NPD, we calculate the commercial success of a game, 
measured as the revenue generated by a game within the first 12 months after its release.8 The 
diffusion of an electronic game follows an L-shaped curve. The average game in our sample makes 
80% of its revenues in the first 12 months after its release. This approach of comparing game 
revenues within the first 12 months after release instead revenues in a given year means we are not 
making the mistake of comparing apples to oranges, i.e., games in different stages of their diffusion. 
Our revenue data are for the period January 1995 to December 2008. Our sample thus includes all 
games that were released between January 1995 and December 2007. 
                                                          
4
 We use the program Pajek to calculate the network measures (available at http://pajek.imfm.si). 
5
 We thus implicitly give direct ties that formed from having worked on a joint project 10 years ago the same 
weight as ties formed one year ago. We thus ignore the possibility of forgotten or now impossible (due, e.g., to 
death) ties (Holan and Phillips 2004). 
6
 The NPD database is also used by other researchers (e.g., Shankar and Bayus 2003; Venkatraman and Lee 
2004; Clements and Ohashi 2005; Stremersch et al. 2007). 
7
 Online sales are covered as their importance has grown. However, as Wal-Mart stopped providing data to all 
research companies in 2002, Wal-Mart sales are projected by NPD only until 2002. 
8
 Revenues are deflated to 1995 U.S.$. Total revenues of the game industry are driven by blockbuster products 
(McGahan 2004). For example, the best-selling game in 2008, ”Wii Sports,” made more than U.S.$ 400 million; 
however, another top 10 game, ”New Super Mario Bros,” made only about a quarter of that (see Figure A.1). 
To account for this skewness in revenue distribution, we use the natural logarithm of revenues in our analysis. 
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In addition to commercial success, we use critics’ scores as a measure of qualitative success. Game 
critics are opinion leaders for hardcore gamers, but they also have some influence on casual gamers 
through specialized magazines and websites. We use critics’ scores that MobyGames has collected 
from the leading game magazines and websites.9 Critics’ scores range from 0 to 100. However, since 
critics’ scores are subjective and may systematically differ between scorers,  we normalize the scores 
by subtracting the critic’s mean score over all games and then dividing by the critic’s standard 
deviation over all games. For a single game, we then derive our variable—i.e., critics’ score—as the 
mean of all normalized critics’ scores judging the respective game. 
We also include the following control variables.10 
Leading Position. This dummy variable indicates whether a person occupies a leading position on the 
development team and is thus chiefly involved in management, or whether the person is an ordinary 
team member and is therefore mainly active in the actual implementation of the game. 
Tenure. We measure the tenure of a person as the number of years between the year the person 
was first involved in game development and the year the game under study was introduced. 
Team Size. As more complex games with detailed and realistic graphics require larger teams, the size 
of the developer team might have a positive influence on game performance. Hence, we control for 
team size in our regression. 
Licensed Game. Since “blockbusters” play such a huge role in the electronic game industry, more and 
more frequently developing firms are using intellectual property from movies or books (e.g., Harry 
Potter or Indiana Jones) or from sports leagues and player associations (e.g., NFL or FIFA) in an 
attempt to appeal to the mass market.11 To control for external intellectual property, we include a 
dummy that is equal to unity if a game is based on external intellectual property. 
Release Month. Due to the high seasonality of the electronic game industry, with its demand and 
supply peaks occurring during the holiday season and during the important trade fairs, we include a 
dummy for the month in which the game is released. 
Genre. Like movies and books, electronic games can be classified into genres, such as role-play 
games or first-person-shooter games. We use the genre classification from the NPD data, which 
distinguishes between 50 different categories. We control for genre as it can heavily influence 
market potential and, therefore, the success of a game. 
                                                          
9
 We use only those magazines and websites that have rated a minimum of 10 games. 
10 Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations for all variables are reported in Table 1 and Table 2, 
respectively. 
11
 Electronic Arts 2005 Annual Report, http://analist.be/reports/electronic_arts-2005.pdf. 
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Platform. Since an electronic game is designed for one or multiple platforms, its success will depend 
on the diffusion of the targeted platform(s). Thus, games developed for more popular platforms 
have higher market potential, but also face stiffer competition. Hence we include dummies for each 
of the 23 platforms observed in our sample. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
3.3. The Impact of a Developer’s Connectedness on a Game’s Success 
Based on the estimation strategy introduced in Section 3.1, Table 3 and 4 report our estimation 
results with cluster (game) robust standard errors. Table 3 report results with a game’s commercial 
success as the outcome measure; Table 4 reports results with critics’ scores as the outcome 
measure. In all specifications, we include fixed effects for the developer, developing firm, publishing 
firm, and time, as well as a set of controls (cf. Section 3.2). 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
In Columns (3-1) and (4-1), social network measures are contemporaneous. There is a significant 
positive association of degree centrality with both success measures, but no additional explanatory 
power from the closeness measure. Taking the results from Column (4-1) as an example and 
assuming that we can interpret our results as causal effects, all else equal, a one standard deviation 
increase in a game developer’s direct ties increases the game’s revenue in the first year by about 
0.02 percentage points. For a top 10 game, which might generate revenues of more than U.S.$ 100 
million, this translates into an increase in revenue of more than U.S.$ 20,000. The development 
team for a top 10 game can include as many as 50 members, meaning that if degree centrality of the 
average team member increases by one standard deviation, revenues will increase by more than 
U.S.$ 1 million. 
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In Columns (3-2) and (4-2), social network measures are lagged, and yet there is still a significant 
positive coefficient for our degree centrality measure. The coefficient is somewhat smaller 
compared to the results in Columns (3-1) and (4-1), which is what we expected since this approach 
ignores the additional value of the developer’s contemporaneous connectedness. The coefficient for 
lagged closeness is not significantly different from zero. 
In Columns (4-3), (4-4), (5-3), and (5-4), we also control for average (lagged) degree centrality and 
average (lagged) closeness of the developer’s co-developers in the game project. Again, we find a 
significant positive association of the individual developer’s degree centrality measure. The 
coefficient for closeness remains insignificant. 
When looking at the results for our control variables, we find no significant influence from tenure, 
but do see a strongly significant positive influence of team size on both success measures. 
Interestingly, licensed games generate higher revenues but receive lower critics’ scores. Perhaps this 
is because licensed content appeals to the mass-market, resulting in higher revenue, but critics find 
original and creative ideas of more value. 
3.4. The Importance of Connectedness for Lead Developers 
In a next step, we take advantage of our data as to whether a developer is in a leading position and 
therefore chiefly engaged in management, or whether he or she is mainly active in game 
implementation. We allow the variable “leading position” to interact with our social network 
measures so as to be able to identify differences between leading and non-leading developers. 
Estimation results with standard errors clustered on the game level are reported in Table 5. In our 
analysis, we focus on the main effect of degree centrality, which is the effect non-leaders can benefit 
from, and the linear combination of degree centrality and the interaction between leading group 
and degree centrality, which is the effect leaders can benefit from. When using revenue as measure 
of success, non-leaders do not benefit significantly from high degree centrality, whereas there is 
strong evidence that leaders do. In contrast, when critics’ score is the dependent variable, leaders do 
not particularly benefit from higher degree centrality. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which a developer’s connectedness to other developers 
influences the success of a project in the knowledge-based electronic game industry. Given the 
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knowledge intensity of the electronic game industry, knowledge spillovers between developers 
should be of special relevance. Based on a comprehensive dataset covering the electronic game 
industry since its infancy, we calculate developers’ connectedness measures at different points in 
time. We find that the number of direct ties a developer has (degree centrality), i.e., the number of 
other developers a developer has worked with on joint game projects, has a strong and economically 
meaningful impact on the success of a game, measured by revenues and critics’ scores. We also find 
evidence for the heterogeneity of this effect between lead and non-lead developers. By contrast, we 
do not find an additional impact from the intensity of a developer’s ties to other developers 
(closeness). These results suggest that direct ties are indeed important in the game industry, but 
that the intensity of indirect ties is not. We argue that our results, which are derived from fixed 
effects regressions with lagged connectedness measures, plausibly can be interpreted as causal 
effects of a developer’s connectedness on a game’s success. 
Ever since the seminal contributions by Jaffe et al. (1993) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996), it is 
common knowledge that knowledge spillovers are regionally bound, and this is also confirmed for 
the game industry, evidenced by the regional clustering of developing and publishing firms in 
Montréal, Canada (Cohendet et al., 2010). Due to government grants, tax allowances, and the 
reputation for creativity of its bilingual, multicultural workforce, Montréal has developed into one of 
the most important sites of the electronic game industry, home to more than 40 developing firms. 
Thus, a natural next step will be to incorporate a regional dimension to our analysis. 
11 
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Figures and tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
VARIABLE 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
ln(Revenue) 151677 14.958 1.701 4.264 19.440 
Critics score 146675 0.007 0.781 -3.831 2.223 
Degree centrality       148627 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.041 
Closeness        148627 0.205 0.038 0.052 0.338 
Leading Position 151677 0.213 0.410 0 1 
Tenure 151677 3.871 4.254 0 28 
Team size 151677 65.780 53.234 1 297 
Licensed game 151677 0.362 0.480 0 1 
 
Table 2: Pair-wise correlations 
VARIABLE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
ln(Revenue) (1) 1.000        
Critics score (2) 0.375 1.000       
Degree centrality       (3) -0.009 0.016 1.000      
Closeness        (4) 0.022 -0.079 0.212 1.000     
Leading Position (5) -0.070 -0.049 -0.092 0.003 1.000    
Tenure (6) 0.040 -0.023 -0.053 0.062 0.236 1.000   
Team size (7) 0.280 0.150 -0.034 0.254 -0.136 0.015 1.000  
Licensed game (8) 0.055 -0.210 -0.023 0.056 0.001 0.026 0.086 1.000 
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Table 3: Baseline regression results with revenue as success measures. 
INDEPENDENT (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) 
VARIABLES DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln(Revenue) 
     
Degree centrality       8.494* 8.029* 7.281** 6.512* 
 (4.468) (4.342) (3.321) (3.644) 
Closeness        -0.137 -0.307 -0.105 -0.223 
 (0.201) (0.217) (0.155) (0.174) 
Coworker degree c.           40.20 56.53 
   (60.77) (45.38) 
Coworker closeness            -0.548 -3.122 
   (3.059) (2.567) 
Tenure 0.0170 0.0612 0.0236 0.0676 
 (0.0618) (0.0886) (0.0664) (0.0932) 
Team size 0.00447*** 0.00396*** 0.00446*** 0.00394*** 
 (0.000937) (0.000990) (0.000938) (0.000991) 
Licensed game 0.192*** 0.172** 0.193*** 0.171** 
 (0.0720) (0.0771) (0.0721) (0.0774) 
     
Network Measures Lagged No Yes No Yes 
Observations 151484 94597 151443 94388 
Number developers 56944 30993 56937 30956 
Within-developer R² 0.635 0.638 0.635 0.638 
Between-developer R² 0.802 0.742 0.798 0.736 
Overall R² 0.736 0.689 0.734 0.684 
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS point estimates with standard errors clustered on the project-level in 
parentheses. As the panels are not nested within the clusters, a degree of freedom adjustment is 
conducted, producing conservative results for the standard errors. Asterisks denote significance 
levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All specifications control for fixed effects on the level of the 
developer, the developing firm, the publishing firm, the release year, the release month, the genre, 
and the platform, but results are not reported here. 
  
14 
Table 4: Baseline regression results with critics score as success measures. 
INDEPENDENT (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) (4-4) 
VARIABLES DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Critics score 
     
Degree centrality       4.043** 3.880* 2.889* 3.175* 
 (2.047) (2.143) (1.623) (1.845) 
Closeness        0.0113 -0.150 0.0170 -0.109 
 (0.0998) (0.110) (0.0795) (0.0890) 
Coworker degree c.           50.71* 20.70 
   (29.32) (21.34) 
Coworker closeness            0.570 -1.492 
   (1.555) (1.312) 
Tenure -0.0248 0.0198 -0.0254 0.0219 
 (0.0300) (0.0423) (0.0323) (0.0444) 
Team size 0.00203*** 0.00180*** 0.00203*** 0.00180*** 
 (0.000502) (0.000524) (0.000503) (0.000526) 
Licensed game -0.276*** -0.265*** -0.274*** -0.264*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0389) (0.0363) (0.0390) 
     
Network Measures Lagged No Yes No Yes 
Observations 146522 91897 146481 91703 
Number developers 55843 30635 55835 0.722 
Within-developer R² 0.542 0.540 0.543 0.541 
Between-developer R² 0.708 0.723 0.706 0.722 
Overall R² 0.654 0.663 0.654 0.661 
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS point estimates with standard errors clustered on the project-level in 
parentheses. As the panels are not nested within the clusters, a degree of freedom adjustment is 
conducted, producing conservative results for the standard errors. Asterisks denote significance 
levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All specifications control for fixed effects on the level of the 
developer, the developing firm, the publishing firm, the release year, the release month, the genre, 
and the platform, but results are not reported here. 
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Table 5: Results for interactions of the network measures with leading position 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT (5-1) (5-2) (5-3) (5-4) 
VARIABLES ln(Revenue) Critics score 
     
Degree centrality       5.746 4.573 4.058* 2.856 
 (4.938) (3.786) (2.249) (1.846) 
Closeness        -0.116 -0.0885 0.0168 0.0174 
 (0.217) (0.172) (0.108) (0.0886) 
Leading position -0.0385 -0.0432 -0.0123 -0.0189 
 (0.0758) (0.0756) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
Leading position *       10.14 9.944 -0.0909 0.0775 
 (6.490) (6.455) (3.532) (3.551) 
Leading position *        -0.0332 -0.0159 -0.0184 0.00451 
 (0.301) (0.300) (0.161) (0.161) 
Coworker degree c.          40.71  50.85* 
  (60.75)  (29.32) 
Coworker closeness           -0.546  0.567 
  (3.059)  (1.555) 
Tenure 0.0171 0.0237 -0.0248 -0.0253 
 (0.0617) (0.0664) (0.0300) (0.0323) 
Team size 0.00445*** 0.00445*** 0.00203*** 0.00202*** 
 (0.000937) (0.000938) (0.000502) (0.000503) 
Licensed game 0.192*** 0.193*** -0.275*** -0.274*** 
 (0.0720) (0.0721) (0.0363) (0.0363) 
     
Network measures lagged No No No No 
Observations 151484 151443 146522 146481 
Number developers 56944 56937 55843 55835 
Within-developer R² 0.635 0.635 0.542 0.543 
Between-developer R² 0.803 0.800 0.706 0.706 
Overall R² 0.737 0.734 0.653 0.653 
     
Degree centrality       + 15.89** 14.52** 3.967 2.933 
(Leading position *      ) (6.213) (5.694) (3.310) (3.124) 
     
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS point estimates with standard errors clustered on the project-level in 
parentheses. As the panels are not nested within the clusters, a degree of freedom adjustment is 
conducted, producing conservative results for the standard errors. Asterisks denote significance 
levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The last two lines are not part of the regression results but 
represent the coefficient of a linear combination together with the respective standard error in 
parentheses. All specifications control for fixed effects on the level of the developer, the developing 
firm, the publishing firm, the release year, the release month, the genre, and the platform, but 
results are not reported here. 
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Appendix (not intended for publication) 
 
Figure A. 1: Revenue and sales rank for all electronic games in the United States in 2008 
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Figure A. 2: Histogram for dependent variable ln(Revenue) 
 
Figure A. 3: Histogram for dependent variable critics score 
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Figure A. 4: Histogram for independent variable degree centrality 
 
Figure A. 5: Histogram for independent variable closeness 
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Figure A. 6: Histogram for the control variable tenure 
 
Figure A. 7: Histogram for the control variable team size 
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